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Residual Viral and Bacterial Contamination of Surfaces after Cleaning
and Disinfection
Era Tuladhar,a,b Wilma C. Hazeleger,b Marion Koopmans,a,c Marcel H. Zwietering,b Rijkelt R. Beumer,b and Erwin Duizera
Laboratory for Infectious Diseases and Screening, Center for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the
Netherlandsa; Laboratory of Food Microbiology, Wageningen University, Wageningen, the Netherlandsb; and Department of Virology, Erasmus Medical Centre,
Rotterdam, the Netherlandsc
Environmental surfaces contaminated with pathogens can be sources of indirect transmission, and cleaning and disinfection are
common interventions focused on reducing contamination levels. We determined the efficacy of cleaning and disinfection pro-
cedures for reducing contamination by noroviruses, rotavirus, poliovirus, parechovirus, adenovirus, influenza virus, Staphylo-
coccus aureus, and Salmonella enterica from artificially contaminated stainless steel surfaces. After a single wipe with water, liq-
uid soap, or 250-ppm free chlorine solution, the numbers of infective viruses and bacteria were reduced by 1 log10 for poliovirus
and close to 4 log10 for influenza virus. There was no significant difference in residual contamination levels after wiping with
water, liquid soap, or 250-ppm chlorine solution.When a single wipe with liquid soap was followed by a second wipe using 250-
or 1,000-ppm chlorine, an extra 1- to 3-log10 reduction was achieved, and except for rotavirus and norovirus genogroup I, no
significant additional effect of 1,000 ppm compared to 250 ppmwas found. A reduced correlation between reduction in PCR
units (PCRU) and reduction in infectious particles suggests that at least part of the reduction achieved in the second step is due
to inactivation instead of removal alone. We used data on infectious doses and transfer efficiencies to estimate a target level to
which the residual contamination should be reduced and found that a single wipe with liquid soap followed by a wipe with 250-
ppm free chlorine solution was sufficient to reduce the residual contamination to below the target level for most of the patho-
gens tested.
Viruses are the most common cause of infectious disease ac-quired in the indoor environment in hospitals, schools, and
households (4), causing considerable impact on human health.
Transmission of enteric and respiratory viruses is assumed to oc-
cur predominantly directly from person to person, followed by
indirect transmission through contaminated surfaces (7, 40, 47,
53). The risk of infection resulting from transmission through
contaminated surfaces depends on a number of factors, including
the level of shedding of infective particles, their stability on sur-
faces and resistance to decontamination procedures, and the low
dose required for infection. Among the enteric viruses, human
noroviruses (NoVs) and rotaviruses are most notorious for caus-
ing outbreaks of gastroenteritis within hospitals, nursing homes,
and cruise ships and are a significant cause of hospitalization (12,
36, 44). Human NoV outbreaks are often prolonged and reoc-
curring (5) due to the high levels of shedding of over 107 NoV
particles/g in stool (45) or vomitus (43) and the low number of
particles required for infection (52). Noroviruses are found on
different types of surfaces (floors, tables, doorknobs, handles, bed
rails, carpets, and curtains) in health care facilities, food produc-
tion facilities, schools, and the community (7, 25, 59). Moreover,
NoVs, and many other enteric viruses, stay infectious for up to
several weeks (19, 38, 56), which is considered another important
factor in environmental transmission.
Besides human NoV, other enteric viruses like poliovirus and
rotavirus and respiratory viruses like influenza virus and adeno-
virus may also be transmitted through contaminated surfaces (7).
Influenza A virus has been frequently associated with epidemics
and occasional pandemics. Adenovirus type 5 is a recommended
test organism for testing disinfectants (22) as well as an interesting
virus since it can be detected in respiratory excretions and in feces
(48). Parechovirus infections have commonly been associated
with mild gastrointestinal symptoms in young children, and
parechoviruses are excreted in feces as well (6). The transmission
of parechovirus through contaminated surfaces has not been re-
ported yet, but an indirect transmission route is likely to play a role
in its spreading, given its similarities to enteroviruses.
Cleaning and disinfection of contaminated surfaces are one of
the frequently implemented measures to control transmission of
pathogens in indoor environments (15, 24, 31). The effectiveness
of cleaning and disinfection practices is oftenmonitored by deter-
mining reductions for bacteria such as Gram-positive Staphylo-
coccus aureus in hospital settings and Staphylococcus aureus and
Gram-negative Salmonella enterica serovar Enteritidis in food
preparation facilities (14, 16). Additionally, the importance of en-
vironmental cleaning to control NoV outbreaks in health care
settings is widely accepted (5, 28, 33), and decontamination of
food production facilities may reduce the number and size of
food-borne outbreaks (8, 17). However, the reduction levels
achieved for bacterial contaminations do not necessarily correlate
with reduction levels for viral contaminations, and as recently
reported byGreig and Lee (30), the scientific proof supporting the
effectiveness of implemented intervention measures is limited.
Therefore, effective science-based control measures to reduce en-
vironmental contamination are urgently needed to reduce the
burden of disease of these viruses.
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To be able to implement the most effective viral decontamina-
tion method, it is necessary to have quantitative data on residual
contamination levels after commonly applied cleaning and disin-
fection practices for some of the most relevant viruses, and pref-
erably, these data should be comparable to data for some bacteria.
Thus, in the present study, we assessed the effects of different
cleaning and disinfection procedures on stainless steel carriers
that were artificially contaminated with poliovirus Sabin 1,
parechovirus 1, NoV GI.4, NoV GII.4 and its cultivable surrogate
murine norovirus 1 (MNV1) (10), simian rotavirus SA 11, influ-
enza A (H1N1) virus, adenovirus type 5, and the bacteria S. aureus
and S. Enteritidis. The experiments were designed to reflect the
order of magnitude of the levels of contamination that may result
from common events such as toilet flushing (3), poor hygiene, or
environmental dispersal of viral particles through droplets gener-
ated during a vomiting accident (11) or remain after removal of
visible contamination.
The residual contamination was quantified by (cell) culture
and PCR assays. As human NoV cannot be cultured (21), the
residual contamination by these viruses was determined by quan-
titative PCR only.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Test organisms and stocks.Viruses used for the testwere poliovirus Sabin
1 (vaccine strain), simian rotavirus SA 11 (ATCC no. VR-1565), adeno-
virus type 5 (Hu/adenovirus/type 5/6270/1988/Ethiopia), influenza A
(H1N1) virus (Hu/influenza A/266/2008/Netherlands [H1N1] virus),
parechovirus 1 (Hu/parechovirus/type 1/147/2008/Netherlands), MNV1
(Mu/NoV/GV/MNV1/2002/USA), human NoV GI.4 (Hu/NoV/GI.4/
946/2009/Netherlands), and human NoV GII.4 (Hu/NoV/GII.4/1803/
2008/Netherlands). The bacterial test organisms were Staphylococcus au-
reus (196E, toxin producer, human isolate) and Salmonella enterica
serovar Enteritidis (phage type 4).
Virus stocks were prepared as described before (57) and stored at
80°C. The stocks used contained the following: poliovirus Sabin 1, 7.2
108 50% tissue culture infective doses (TCID50)/ml and 5.3  10
11 PCR
units (PCRU)/ml; adenovirus type 5, 2.8 107 TCID50/ml and 6.7 10
9
PCRU/ml; parechovirus 1, 3.9  108 TCID50/ml and 6.7  10
10 PCRU/
ml; rotavirus 5, 1.4 108 TCID50/ml and 6.7 10
9 PCRU/ml; influenza
A (H1N1) virus, 2.3  107 TCID50/ml and 2.0  10
9 PCRU/ml; and
MNV1, 4.9 106 TCID50/ml and 1.2 10
9 PCRU/ml. The human NoV
GI.4 and GII.4 stocks were 6.6  108 and 1.1  108 PCRU/ml, respec-
tively.
S. aureus and S. Enteritidis were cultured in brain heart infusion broth
(Difco) and enumerated on tryptone soy agar (Oxoid, England) as de-
scribed before (37). Bacterial stocks contained 8.8  109 CFU/ml of S.
aureus and 4.2 108 CFU/ml of S. Enteritidis, and the detection limit of
both bacteria was 10 CFU per contaminated spot.
Preparation of sterile stool suspension. The sterile stool suspension
from a healthy volunteer was prepared (57), and the suspension was free
of rotaviruses, enteric adenoviruses, astroviruses, and sapoviruses as de-
termined by PCR (50).
Cleaning and disinfection experiments. The cleaning and disinfec-
tion experiments were performed on 2.2-cm by 2.2-cm stainless steel car-
riers (AISI type 304 standard; Netherlands). The carriers were degreased
by being dipped into acetone for 10 min, followed by being rinsed five
times under running tap water. Thereafter, the carriers were soaked in
70% alcohol and dried. The carriers were then sterilized by autoclaving
(121°C for 15min). The viscose wiping cloth was cut into pieces (approx-
imately 4 cm by 3.5 cm) and sterilized by autoclaving.
One chlorine tablet (Suma Tab D4; Germany) was dissolved in 1,000
ml sterile water. From this solution, 250- and 1,000-ppm chlorine solu-
tions were freshly prepared and free chlorine concentrations were mea-
sured using a Hatch colorimeter kit (Hanna HI 96771; Romania).
Bovine serum albumin (BSA) (3% [wt/vol] in water) or sterile stool
suspension (20% [wt/vol]) was added to the virus stock to perform the
experiments under clean and dirty conditions. Final concentrations were
0.03% BSA and 1% stool, respectively. Since human stool is not the nat-
ural matrix for influenza A virus, this experiment was performed under
clean conditions only. The human NoVs were used as 10% (wt/vol) stool
suspensions, and no extra feces was added. Stainless steel carriers were
contaminated by spreading 30 l of each virus suspension in 0.03% (wt/
vol) BSA or 1% (wt/vol) stool separately (contaminated spot) and there-
after dried inside a biosafety cabinet for 1 h at room temperature (22 to
25°C, 40 to 45% relative humidity [RH]). Then the following cleaning and
disinfection procedures were applied.
(i) Single wiping. One thousand milliliters of each cleaning and dis-
infection solution was prepared. The cloth pieces were soaked in water,
water with liquid soap, or 250-ppm or 1,000-ppm free chlorine solutions
separately, and excess liquid was squeezed out by hand. With this wet
cloth, the contaminated carriers were wiped once by hand and sampled 20
min after wiping.
(ii) Double wiping. The carriers contaminated with viruses and bac-
teria were wiped once with the cloth soaked in water with liquid soap as
described for the single-wiping procedure and wiped once again with
cloths that were soaked in 250- or 1,000-ppm free chlorine solution and
wrung. The carriers were sampled after 20 min. Gloves were worn
throughout the cleaning process and changed after each wiping.
For sampling, the carrier was kept in a sterile flat-bottomed tube
(Sarstedt 60.597.001; Germany) with the wiped surface facing upwards,
and 2 ml cold Dulbecco’s modified Eagle medium (4 to 8°C) with 10%
fetal bovine serum (DMEM-FBS) was added for neutralization. For the
carriers that were wiped with chlorine solutions, 500 l of 7% (wt/vol)
sodium thiosulfate solution inwaterwas added for neutralization first and
then 1,500 l DMEM-FBS was added. Thereafter, the virus was extracted
by vortexing at maximum speed for 30 s and flushing the carrier with the
medium several times. The suspensions were then collected, and infective
viruses were enumerated by cell culture assays. Additionally, quantitative
PCR assays were performed on samples obtained from wiping with water
with liquid soap or 1,000-ppm free chlorine solution (single wiping) and
on samples obtained fromwiping with water with liquid soap followed by
wipingwith 1,000-ppm free chlorine solution (double wiping) to quantify
the genomic copies left.
Spot disinfection. If infective virus could still be detected after wiping
with water with liquid soap followed by wiping with 1,000-ppm free chlo-
rine solution, virus inactivation was further tested by spot disinfection
under dirty conditions to determine if extra contact timewith the chlorine
solution would result in lower residual contamination levels. After the
contaminated carrier was wiped with water with liquid soap, 800 l of
1,000-ppm free chlorine solution was added onto the carrier so that the
carrier was completely covered with the chlorine solution for 5, 10, and 20
min. After the exposure time, the chlorine solution was neutralized with
an equal volume of 7% (wt/vol) sodium thiosulfate solution in water and
400 l DMEM-FBS was added to make a total volume of 2 ml. Untreated
carriers were kept as control. For a neutralization control, compounds
(liquid soap or chlorine solutions) were diluted with DMEM-FBS or neu-
tralized with 7% sodium thiosulfate solution before addition to the virus.
The experiments were also performed with S. aureus and S. Enteritidis.
Neutralized bacteriological peptone water (Oxoid, England) was used in-
stead of DMEM-FBS. As stool is not the natural matrix for S. aureus, the
experiment was done only under clean conditions.
TCID50 determination. The viruses were enumerated by titration in
96-well plates on sensitive cells as described before (57).
Real-time PCR. To allow comparison of virus reductions between the
cultivable viruses and the noncultivable human NoVs (21), quantitative
PCR assays were performed. Viral nucleic acid extraction was performed
using the Magna Pure total nucleic acid extraction kit as described before
Tuladhar et al.
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(50). Real-time PCR assays were performed as described before for polio-
virus Sabin 1 (18), adenovirus type 5 (34), rotavirus SA 11 (50), parecho-
virus 1 (55), MNV1 (2), and human NoV GI.4 (50) and NoV GII.4 (57).
Amplifiable PCRUwere determined by slopes of standard curvesmade for
each virus. The standard curve wasmade by plotting cyclic threshold (CT)
values versus log PCRU of 10-fold dilutions of the virus stocks. The high-
est dilution giving a positive result was assigned a value of 1 PCRU.
Residual contamination. In order to provide data that will allow for
risk assessments, we present data on the basis of residual contamination
instead of pathogen reduction. The number of pathogens present on the
carrier after cleaning or after cleaning and disinfection was considered the
residual contamination. The reduction of the pathogens was calculated as
(log10 pathogens on the control carrier)  (log10 pathogens on wiped
carrier). The control carriers were contaminated and dried but not sub-
jected to the treatments. All the experiments were performed in triplicate
and repeated for confirmation (n 6).
Data analysis. Statistical analysis was performed by using Student’s t
test. The log10 values of infectivity (x) and PCRU (y) reduction for clean-
ing with liquid soap or 1,000-ppm chlorine solution and wiping with
liquid soap followed by wiping with 1,000-ppm chlorine solution were
plotted to compare with the line of equality y x.
RESULTS
Calculation of the residual contamination target level. The re-
sidual contamination on the carrier after cleaning anddisinfection
poses a riskwhen enough infectiousmicroorganisms can be trans-
ferred to individuals either to cause infection or to continue trans-
mission indirectly through handling. The data for transfer of mi-
croorganisms from contaminated surfaces to the human hand
(finger pads) have been determined for rotavirus and hepatitis A
virus (1, 42) and shown to be approximately 20% after 20 min of
drying (1). The number of viruses required for peroral infection is
estimated as 10 to 100 infectious particles for rotavirus, norovirus,
poliovirus, parechovirus, and influenza A virus (23, 32, 51, 60),
and approximately 150 infectious particles for adenovirus (29).
An estimated 10 to 100 cells are required for peroral S. Enteritidis
infection (49) and S. aureus infection. If we assume 20% transfer
from fomite to fingers for all microorganisms tested, then the risk
of infection will be small if the residual contamination is less than
5 times the number of particles required for infection; this level
may result in an infection only in the unlikely event that a contami-
nated finger is directly put in the mouth.We therefore assumed that
at residual contamination levels of infective particles of less than 50
(1.7 log10) for rotavirus, MNV1, poliovirus, parechovirus, influenza
A (H1N1) virus, S. Enteritidis, and S. aureus and less than 750 (2.9
log10) for adenovirus type 5, per contact spot, the probability of con-
tinued transmission or becoming infected is low (but not zero). On
the basis of this assumption, lines indicating the residual contamina-
tion target levels were drawn in Fig. 1.
Residual contamination after cleaning—single wiping. The
recovery of the viruses and bacteria from the stainless steel carriers
after drying for 1 h ranged from 24 to 76%. After wiping, the
surfaces were visibly dry within 3 min. The residual contamina-
tion levels of infective viruses and bacteria under clean and dirty
conditions after single and double wiping are shown in Fig. 1.
There was no significant difference in residual contamination af-
ter wipingwithwater and after wipingwithwater with liquid soap.
For poliovirus and rotavirus only, there was a minor but signifi-
cantly higher residual contamination when feces were present
than under clean conditions.We found little or no effect of the use
of 250-ppm chlorine solutions instead of liquid soap in the clean-
ing step; for rotavirus under dirty conditions and influenzaA virus
only (i.e., in only 2 out of 14 pathogen-matrix combinations
tested), a lower residual contamination was seen when 250-ppm
chlorine was used.
The residual contamination after wipingwith 1,000-ppm chlo-
rine solution was significantly lower (P  0.05) than that after
wiping with water or liquid soap in 10 out of 14 pathogen-matrix
combinations. Additionally, in 7 out of 14 pathogen-matrix com-
binations the wipe with 1,000-ppm chlorine solutions resulted in
a significantly lower residual contamination than did wiping with
250-ppm chlorine solution.
Residual contamination after cleaning and disinfection—
double wiping. The residual contamination after wiping with liq-
uid soap followed by wiping with 250-ppm chlorine solution
(double wiping) was significantly lower (P 0.05) than that after
wiping with liquid soap alone (single wiping) for most of the vi-
ruses (except MNV1 and rotavirus) and bacteria tested (Fig. 1).
After the double wiping procedure, there was no significant differ-
ence (P 0.05) in residual contamination between 250- and 1,000-
ppm chlorine solutions in 12 out of 14 pathogen-matrix combina-
tions. For rotavirus only, the reduction achievedwith 1,000 ppmwas
better than the reduction achieved with 250-ppm chorine solution,
resulting ina residual contaminationof less than2 infectiousparticles
per spot (detection limit;6-log10 reduction).
Reduction of genomic copies of norovirus after cleaning and
disinfection. As human NoVs could not be cultured, the reduc-
tions in genomic copies were quantified by PCR assays. The re-
ductions in genomic copies of NoV GI.4, GII.4, and MNV1 are
shown in Fig. 2. For MNV1, all the treatments resulted in a com-
parable reduction, while for NoV GI.4 and GII.4, we observed a
significantly higher reduction in PCRU with the double wiping
protocol. In 5 out of 6 treatments, the reductions in PCRU dif-
fered between NoV GI.4 and MNV1; in 3 out of 6, they differed
between NoV GI.4 and NoV GII.4; and in 2 out of 6, they differed
between NoV GII.4 and MNV1.
Reduction of infective load and genomic copies. The PCRU
reductions of poliovirus Sabin 1, adenovirus type 5, parechovirus
1, MNV1, rotavirus SA 11, and influenza A (H1N1) virus by wip-
ing with water with liquid soap or with 1,000-ppm chlorine solu-
tion and wiping with water with liquid soap followed by wiping
with 1,000-ppm chlorine solution were also determined. The
equality between reduction of genomic copies and reduction of
infectivity of the tested viruses under clean conditions is shown in
Fig. 3. After wiping with water with liquid soap, there was a cor-
relation between the infectivity and PCRU reduction except for
rotavirus SA 11 and influenza A (H1N1) virus. The infectivity
reduction was higher than the PCRU reduction (i.e., deviating
from the equality line) on wiping with 1,000-ppm chlorine solu-
tion and with liquid soap followed by wiping with 1,000-ppm
chlorine solution in the case of parechovirus 1, rotavirus SA 11,
MNV1, adenovirus type 5, and influenza A (H1N1) virus.
Residual contamination after spot disinfection. Since there
was residual contamination byMNV1, poliovirus Sabin 1, adeno-
virus type 5, parechovirus 1, and S. Enteritidis after the double
wiping procedure using 1,000-ppm chlorine, spot disinfection of
the bacteria and viruses under dirty conditions by 1,000-ppm
chlorine solution after cleaning with water with liquid soap was
tested to determine if this treatment would result in a residual
contamination that is below the detection limit. The residual con-
taminationwas reduced to below the detection limit of 10 particles
ofMNV1 in 5min (a reduction of 5 log10) and of poliovirus Sabin
Viral Contamination after Cleaning and Disinfection
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1 (6.9 log10) and adenovirus type 5 (5.3 log10) in 10 min. The
infective loads of parechovirus 1 and S. Enteritidis were reduced
by 3.2  0.1 and 4.9  0.4 log10, respectively, within 20 min of
disinfection. Genomic copies of NoVs GI.4 (6.7 log10 PCRU) and
GII.4 (5.2 log10 PCRU) were reduced to below the detection limit
of 60 PCRU/spot after 10 and 5 min, respectively. MNV1 was
reduced by 6.9  0.7 log10 PCRU within 20 min of disinfection
with 1,000-ppm free chlorine solution.
DISCUSSION
Our data indicate that in the case of an outbreak of gastroenteritis,
by eitherNoV, rotavirus, or Salmonella, a cleaning stepwith liquid
soap followed by awipe using a 1,000-ppm chlorine solutionmost
consistently results in the lowest residual contamination level of
all treatments tested. However, if we assume that an equivalent of
1 in 2 NoV PCRU is infectious (data for NoV GI.1 [52]), the
residual infectivity of NoV GI.4 and GII.4 will be approximately
5 102 or 5 103 infectious particles (approximately 1 103 or
1 104 PCRU), respectively, per contaminated spot, which is well
above the level that we defined as target level. Increasing the con-
tact time between the pathogen and the 1,000-ppm chlorine solu-
tion to at least 5 min (as studied by spot disinfection) did result in
residual contamination below the target levels of NoV and rotavi-
rus and may be considered an effective intervention strategy in
controlling gastroenteric pathogen transmission via hard surfaces,
although itmay be impractical. Our data suggest that S.Enteritidis
may still be present at loads above our target levels; however, the
low prevalence of S.Enteritidis in nonfood and health care-related
outbreaks (58) suggests that transmission via hard surfaces is not a
main route of transmission for this pathogen. We did not find
clear differences in the reductions in infective enteric viruses or
viable bacteria in our experiments, indicating that the apparently
FIG 1 Residual contamination of different pathogens on stainless steel carriers under clean (white bars) and dirty (black bars) conditions after different cleaning
and disinfection methods. Control is the recovery after 1 h of drying. Water, liquid soap, 250-ppm chlorine, and 1,000-ppm chlorine indicate the suspensions
used to wet a wipe for the one-wipe (cleaning) procedure. Soap/250 ppm and Soap/1,000 ppm indicate the consecutive suspensions used to wet wipes for the
two-step (cleaning and disinfection) procedure. Error bars indicate standard deviations of the means, and means with different letters differ significantly (P
0.05) (n 6). The horizontal lines in the figures indicate the residual contamination target levels.
Tuladhar et al.
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greater outbreak potential of NoV and rotavirus is not due to a
higher resistance to cleaning and disinfection but more likely due
to the extremely high infectivity of NoV and the high levels of
shedding for rotavirus.
Due to the inability to cultivate the human NoVs in vitro, sev-
eral cultivable viruses such as feline calicivirus (FCV), canine cali-
civirus (CaCV),MS2 bacteriophage, andMNV1have been used as
surrogates to study NoV inactivation (10, 20, 46). However, NoV
GI and GII viruses differ in binding properties for shellfish tissues
and lettuce surfaces, for example (41, 54), and also in resistance to
freeze-drying and heat treatment (9, 35), making it unlikely that
one model virus will be a valuable surrogate for NoV GI and NoV
GII. This was confirmed in our studies that showed inconsisten-
cies in the level of correlation of MNV results with those for NoV
GII.4 and GI.4 in complex situations such as this study where
removal and disinfection were combined. In the absence of a cul-
tivation method for the human NoV, we postulate that especially
for quantitative risk assessment purposes, the use of any model
virus should be accompanied by a PCR-based method to allow
comparison.
The two picornaviruses tested (poliovirus and parechovirus)
showed remarkable differences in residual contamination and
thus risk of infection remaining after cleaning; however, this was
mainly caused by a 2-log10 difference in starting contamination
level. Since differences in levels of shedding do occur (13, 39),
these data may reflect real variation in levels of contamination
FIG 2 Reduction of genomic copies of human NoVs GI.4 (white bars) and GII.4 (gray bars) and MNV1 (black bars) under dirty conditions after different
cleaning methods. Water, liquid soap, 250-ppm chlorine, and 1,000-ppm chlorine indicate the suspensions used to wet a wipe for the one-wipe (cleaning)
procedure. Liquid soap/250-ppm chlorine and liquid soap/1,000-ppm chlorine indicate the consecutive suspensions used to wet wipes for the two-step (cleaning
and disinfection) procedure. Error bars indicate standard deviations of the means, and means with different letters differ significantly (P 0.05) (n 6).
FIG 3 Correlation between PCR units and infectivity reduction by different cleaning methods under clean and dirty conditions of poliovirus Sabin 1 (dia-
monds), adenovirus type 5 (squares), parechovirus 1 (circles), rotavirus SA 11 (triangles), MNV1 (rectangles), and influenza A (H1N1) virus (asterisks) (n 6).
White, gray, and black symbols represent the reductions by wiping with liquid soap or 1,000-ppm chlorine solution and wiping with liquid soap followed by
wiping with 1,000-ppm chlorine solution, respectively. In some cases, only one data point is visible due to overlap of data points.
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after cleaning and disinfection. Spot disinfection showed a re-
markably resistant parechovirus fraction, as some parechoviruses
could still be cultured after 20 min of exposure to 1,000-ppm
chlorine solution. Such a very resistant virus fraction, represent-
ing 0.01% of the stock suspensions used, was also shown to exist
during thermal inactivation at 73°C (55). Due to the low infec-
tious dose, these resistant fractions may represent a risk when
present in foods or on surfaces when very high levels are shed.
In this study, we confirmed the higher sensitivity of the envel-
oped respiratory influenza A virus than of the nonenveloped en-
teric viruses to disinfection (56), and the complete removal of
infectious influenza virus after a single wipe with a 1,000-ppm
chlorine solution confirms a recent study that showed complete
inactivation of human influenza A viruses bywipes containing 1%
bleach (sodium hypochlorite and sodium hydroxide) (27). The
two-step procedure consisting of a single wipe with liquid soap
followed by a disinfection step using 250-ppm chlorine solution is
likely to be a good intervention strategy in cases of viral respiratory
disease outbreaks since it reduced the infectivity of both respira-
tory viruses tested to well below the target level.
The efficacy of cleaning and disinfection is determined not
only by the intrinsic effectiveness of the method applied but also
by the appropriateness of the surfaces treated. Cleaning and dis-
infection should be focused on the critical spots, i.e., the surfaces
mainly involved in transmission. Reducing the infective load on
critical spots such as doorknobs, handles, light switches, and other
frequently touched surfaces is more likely to have a profound im-
pact on transmission than is treating rarely touched surfaces. In-
terestingly, a recent study on the removal of viruses from hard
surfaces found a reduction of infective MNV1 after wiping the
surfaces 6 times (26) comparable to what we found after a single
wipe, indicating that surface cleaning and disinfection can be per-
formed quite efficiently. Nonetheless, manual cleaning and disin-
fection procedures will always be more labor-intensive than, for
example, room disinfection using hydrogen peroxide vapor (57),
and for the control of outbreaks, a combination of the two meth-
ods is most likely needed.
In this study, we performed cleaning and disinfection by wip-
ing as it may be carried out in health care settings. Since these
procedures will be carried out by different individuals, variability
in residual contamination levels is likely. Additional variation will
occur due to differences in levels of shedding, differences in tem-
perature and humidity, and types of contaminated surfaces. How-
ever, tests like these, even if describing just one scenario, provide
the scientific background for evidence-based cleaning and disin-
fection guidelines or protocols.
In health care facilities, cleaning may be performed according
to different protocols: general cleaning performedon a day-to-day
basis and more stringent cleaning, often in combination with dis-
infection procedures, during outbreaks. Our findings show that in
all cases a single wipe with a wet cloth with either water or liquid
soap resulted in a significant reduction (1 log10) of the infective
load of all pathogens tested, but the residual contaminations in-
dicate that further transmission may still occur. Adding a wiping
step with 250- or 1,000-ppm chlorine solution resulted in an ad-
ditional reduction of the infective load, most likely through inac-
tivation of the pathogens rather than by particle removal, as indi-
cated by the discrepancy between infectivity and PCRU reduction.
Precleaning before disinfection of the contaminated surfaces is
recommended, and the removal and disinfection together will of-
ten result in residual contamination levels below the target levels
of residual contamination.
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